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Hayes: Fernandez v. California and the Expansion of Third-Party Consent

FERNANDEZ V. CALIFORNIA AND THE EXPANSION OF THIRD-PARTY
CONSENT SEARCHES
Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014)
Anna P. Hayes*
Imagine a day when the police come knocking at your door: you
open the door, and the police ask you if they may conduct a warrantless
search of your residence. As any good constitutional law student would,
you explain to them that you are well aware of your rights under the
Fourth Amendment, and that they should come back with a warrant.
Because the dutiful officers believe that you have committed a crime,
they arrest you on the spot, rather than obtaining a search warrant for
the premises. After arresting you and removing you from the premises,
the officers then ask your roommate for permission to search the
premises—not as well schooled in Fourth Amendment law, your
roommate signs over his consent.1 You protest: “I refused to consent to
the search!” you say—“the police can’t ignore my objection!” The
Supreme Court in Fernandez v. California recently ruled that the Fourth
Amendment does not forbid a search such as the one discussed above.2
This Comment will discuss the history behind the consent exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Fernandez decision,
and its implications for future police activity.
The Fernandez case began in 2009, when an assailant, armed with a
knife, committed a gang-related robbery. 3 Police investigating the
robbery drove to an alley they knew to be frequented by members of the
gang.4 Upon their arrival in the gang’s territory, a man approached the
officers and told them that “the guy is in the apartment.”5 The man, who
“appeared very scared,” then repeated: “He’s in there. He’s in the
apartment.”6 Immediately thereafter, the officers witnessed another man
* J.D. 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. 2011, Georgia Institute of
Technology. I am grateful to all of the members of the Florida Law Review, especially Karl
Gruss and Kathleen Carlson, for their support and friendship, and to Professor Dennis Calfee for
his superb dedication to every member of the Review.
1. As there is no Miranda-esque requirement that police make statements to any person
whose residence they search warning the subject of the search that he or she has a right to refuse
to give consent, this situation is likely to continue to occur. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 231–32 (1973) (citation omitted) (stating that the suggestion that police inform the
subject of the search that he has a right to refuse consent has been consistently rejected because
“these situations are still immeasurably far removed from ‘custodial interrogation’ where, in
Miranda v. Arizona, we found that the Constitution required certain now familiar warnings”).
2. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct.
1126 (2014).
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run from the alley into an apartment building, another known gang
hideout. 7 After the man entered the apartment, the officers heard
screams and other sounds of fighting emitting from the residence.8
After waiting for backup to arrive, the officers knocked on the door
of the residence from which they had heard the screams. 9 A woman
opened the door—she “appeared to be crying[, h]er face was
red, . . . she had a large bump on her nose,” and her hand and shirt were
stained with seemingly fresh blood.10 She told the officers that she had
been in a fight, and when the officers asked her if anyone else was in
the apartment, she told them that she was alone with her son and that no
one else was present.11 When the officers asked her if she would step
outside so that they could conduct a protective sweep of the apartment,
a man—the petitioner, dressed only in his underwear and seemingly
agitated—appeared in the doorway.12 The man objected to the search,
stating: “You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my rights.”13
The officers suspected domestic violence and immediately removed the
man from the residence and placed him under arrest.14 After the victim
of the robbery identified the man as his attacker, officers escorted the
man to the police station for booking.15
One hour after the initial arrest, officers returned to the apartment,
informed the woman that they had arrested the petitioner, and again
asked for permission to search the premises.16 The woman consented to
the search. 17 In the apartment, police found gang paraphernalia, a
weapon and clothing similar to those used by the robbery suspect,
ammunition, and a sawed-off shotgun—however, the police never
found any of the items stolen from the robbery victim. 18 Using the
evidence they did find, the government charged the petitioner with
“robbery, infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse, cohabitant, or
7. Id.
8. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
9. Id. Note that this Comment does not discuss whether the police would have been
justified in entering the premises on the basis of exigent circumstances, a widely recognized
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (“[I]f truly exigent circumstances exist no warrant is required under
general Fourth Amendment principles.”).
10. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. This Comment does not address whether this search could be deemed a valid
search incident to arrest.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1130–31; People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012),
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
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child’s parent, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a shortbarreled shotgun, and felony possession of ammunition.”19
At his trial, the petitioner moved to suppress the evidence found
during what he characterized as a warrantless search of his apartment in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 20 He claimed that the consent
exception to the warrant requirement was not met in his case, because
he had objected to the search before the police forcibly removed him
from the premises. However, the Supreme Court found that the search
was lawful and that the consent given by the petitioner’s coresident
validated the warrantless search.21
Generally, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
dictates that officers may search a jointly owned residence if one of the
occupants consents to the search and that police may discover and use
evidence against an absent, nonconsenting co-occupant.22 However, the
Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the consenting
coresident rule in Georgia v. Randolph and held that consent from any
coresident to a warrantless search is invalid when another coresident is
present and objects to the search.23 How then, under Randolph, was the
search conducted in Fernandez lawful? Before analyzing the soundness
of the Fernandez ruling and its ramifications, this Comment will discuss
the establishment of the third-party consent exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement and Randolph’s narrowing of that
exception.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”24 The courts have interpreted “unreasonable” to
mean without a warrant—meaning that any search performed without a
warrant is per se unreasonable. 25 In United States v. Matlock, the
Supreme Court made clear that a warrantless search is nevertheless
valid when “permission to search [is] obtained from a third party who
possessed common authority over . . . the premises.”26 However, the
Court later narrowed the consent exception in Georgia v. Randolph. In
19. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1131 (citations omitted).
20. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58.
21. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
22. Id. at 1129 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)).
23. 547 U.S. 103, 114 (2006) (“Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third
party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and
objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim
to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.” (footnotes omitted)).
26. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170–71 (1974).
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Randolph, the Court held that even if one cotenant gives permission to
search, “a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit
entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and
invalid as to him.”27
In Randolph, the police arrived at the residence of a married couple
after the wife reported a domestic dispute.28 When the officers arrived at
the residence, the wife alleged that her husband was a cocaine user who
had drug paraphernalia stored inside their house.29 The police requested
permission to search the marital residence, and the husband
“unequivocally refused.” 30 Immediately after his refusal, the officer
“turned to [the wife] for consent to search, which she readily gave.”31
Inside the home, the police discovered a substance that they suspected
was cocaine and other evidence of drug use.32 At his trial, the husband
moved to suppress the evidence found, but the trial court rejected the
motion because the wife “had common authority to consent to the
search.”33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question that
had arisen as to whether one coresident can give consent that can
override the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “against a cotenant who is present and states a refusal to permit the search.”34 The
Court held that a warrantless search conducted over the express refusal
of a physically present resident is not reasonable, even if another
coresident does consent to the search. 35 In its opinion, the Court
emphasized that the key consideration for consent searches is not
technical property law, but “the great significance given to widely
shared social expectations.”36 Social norms dictate that a guest would
not feel welcome to enter a residence if one resident stood at the door
calling the guest to come in, while another coresident stood in the same
doorway warning the guest to stay out.37 As the Court surmised, “[N]o
27. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106.
28. Id. at 107.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 107–08.
34. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 120.
36. Id. at 111 (stating also that these social expectations “are naturally enough influenced
by the law of property, but [are] not controlled by its rules”); see also id. at 120–21 (“[T]he
‘right’ to admit the police to which Matlock refers is not an enduring and enforceable ownership
right as understood by the private law of property, but is instead the authority recognized by
customary social usage as having a substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in
specific circumstances.”).
37. Id. at 113.
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sensible person would go inside under those conditions;” and therefore,
the consent exception to the warrant requirement cannot overcome a
present objector. 38 The Court cited several examples where social
customs would not dictate acceptable entry, including a landlord–tenant
relationship (where no person would reasonably expect that a tenant
would allow a landlord to let visitors into the residence), and a hotel
manager (where no one would expect anyone but hotel employees to be
allowed access into occupied rooms). 39 However, the Supreme Court
admitted to drawing a fine line—the line which became the very issue
of Fernandez: when the police have a nearby coresident, a potential
objector, the officers do not have to “invite[] [the nearby coresident] to
take part in the threshold colloquy, [who then] loses out.”40 Thereafter,
a question remained for the Fernandez court: What side of the “fine
line” does a search fall on when it occurs after a formerly present
defendant is present and objects, but the police remove the defendant
before asking the cotenant for permission to search?41
In Fernandez, the Court held that the “narrow exception” to the
consent rule created by Randolph42 did not apply when a cotenant gave
police consent to search a residence even when a defendant objected to
the search, because the defendant was not physically present when the
cotenant consented to the search. 43 The only significant difference
between the facts in Randolph and the facts in Fernandez was that the
police removed the objector before asking the cotenant for permission
to search. 44 The Court noted that Randolph “went to great lengths to
make clear that its holding was limited to situations in which the
objecting occupant is present.” 45 This emphasis on physical presence
spurred the Fernandez Court to rule constitutional a search where the
defendant was not physically present at the time his cotenant consented
to the search—even when the police caused the absence of the
defendant–objector.46 The defendant in Fernandez made two arguments:
first, that the physical “presence of the objecting occupant is not
38. Id. at 1114–15 (“Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no
recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant,
his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in
entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”).
39. Id. at 112.
40. Id. at 121.
41. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014).
42. Id. at 1133.
43. Id. at 1134 (stating that the petitioner’s arguments that “his absence should not matter
since he was absent only because the police had taken him away,” or that the fact that he
objected to the search while physically present on the premises should have remained effective
until he no longer wished to keep the police out of his home, were both unsound).
44. Compare id., with Randolph, 547 U.S. 103.
45. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1133–34.
46. Id.
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necessary when the police are responsible for his absence,” 47 and
second, that the defendant’s “objection, made at the threshold of the
premises that the police wanted to search, remained effective until he
changed his mind and withdrew his objection.”48
The Fernandez Court rejected the first argument and brushed off any
suggestion of impropriety arising when police remove an objecting
cotenant after his objection to the search, stating that the mere
suggestion of improper motive should not invalidate a removal that is
objectively justified.49 Here, the Court went astray from the ruling in
Randolph and cases prior—it failed to “jealously and carefully draw[]”
the consent exception to the warrant requirement.50 The Court refused to
examine the motives of the police because it felt that the arrest was
unquestionably justified.51 When it ignored the possible motive of the
police to skirt the Fourth Amendment, the Court seriously blurred the
line governing police conduct during a warrantless search. Even more,
the Court disregarded Randolph’s warning that there should be “no
evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant
from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection.”52 In
doing so, the Court has opened the door to serious police confusion and
even potential misconduct. Fernandez allows courts to ignore concerns
that police may have incentives to purposefully evade the Fourth
Amendment. Given the growing public distrust of the police arising
from officer misconduct in places such as New York City 53 and
Ferguson, Missouri, 54 the Fernandez Court’s decision to turn a blind
eye to the potentially illicit motivations of police officers contrasts
sharply with public demands to bring police practices under the
microscope.55
47. Id. at 1134.
48. Id. at 1135.
49. Id. at 1134.
50. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
51. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134.
52. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Chris Francescani, Silent March to Protest NYPD’s “Stop-and-Frisk”
Policy, REUTERS (Jun. 17, 2012, 7:36 PM), http://www.nyclu.org/news/decision-moves-cityone-step-closer-stop-and-frisk-reform.
54. In Ferguson, Missouri, a black teenager was shot six times and killed by a police
officer. This shooting triggered days of violent protests, looting, hundreds of arrests, and the
governor of Missouri calling out the National Guard to help stop the riots. See, e.g., Monica
Davey, John Eligon & Alan Blinder, National Guard Troops in Ferguson Fail to Quell Disorder,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/us/fergusonmissouri-protests.html; Alan Scher Zagier, Tensions Subside After Peaceful Ferguson Protests,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2014, 4:42 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/streets-fergusonstay-calm-violent-nights-25095870 (stating that one resident believes “some of the frustration is
dying down because more information is coming out”).
55. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y.
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The Court has repeatedly in Fourth Amendment cases rejected
invitations to examine the investigating officer’s mindset and instead
has reached for objective standards with which to analyze searches and
seizures.56 However, the Fernandez Court refused to consider that there
were objective reasons as to why a police officer would remove a
potential objector from the premises to avoid hearing an objection that
could undermine the search. The temptation for unjustified removal
becomes all the more powerful when a police officer can remove a
coresident who has already objected to the search; for then, the officer
has the opportunity to persuade remaining coresidents to consent.
Not only has the Court implicitly allowed possible police
misconduct to occur undeterred, but it has undermined the good
intentions of even the most honest and law-abiding civil servants. How
should an officer know when he can remove an objecting cotenant and
still receive permission to search the premises? On one hand, the police
officer knows he is not supposed to act in direct contravention of the
spirit of the warrant requirement.57 On the other hand, if the officer does
not conduct the search, he may lose valuable evidence that could keep a
dangerous criminal off of the streets. The Court also left open the
question of whether a police officer must wait after hearing an objection
and removing the objector to get consent to search—an hour was
deemed reasonable in Fernandez,58 but what about thirty minutes? Ten
minutes? Two?59
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/howthe-supreme-court-protects-bad-cops.html?_r=0 (asserting that the Supreme Court has also
made civil suits against police officers extraordinarily difficult to pursue).
56. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (“The scheme of the Fourth
Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those
charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken
was appropriate?” (footnote omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925)); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (“An action is ‘reasonable’
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ The officer’s subjective motivation is
irrelevant.” (alteration in original)).
57. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (discussing the Miranda warnings and stating generally that courts “have no doubt
that . . . the police behave responsibly and do not deliberately exert [inappropriate] pressures
upon the suspect[s]” but that bright-line rules, such as those set in place by Miranda are to
ensure against the rare police misconduct, relieve “inherently compelling pressures,” and “as
much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases”).
58. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
59. It would seem that the Court in Fernandez, by not dictating a timeframe requirement,
has made it possible for an officer to hear an objection, remove the objector from the premises,
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Interestingly, the majority concluded that the petitioner’s second
argument (that an objection lasts for as long as the objector desires) is
unworkable because of practical problems arising from any permanent
objection,60 but also rejected the argument that the objection should last
only for a “reasonable” time.61 However, the problems with allowing
objections to last for a “reasonable” time are mirrored in the majority’s
solution that the objector must be physically present—for it is doubtful
that the Randolph Court envisioned a day when police could remove a
physically present objector from the premises, only to receive consent
seconds later. 62 The Court in Fernandez should have more seriously
considered the argument that the objection last for a “reasonable time,”
especially because “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness.’” 63 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of drawing clear lines to help the police
adhere to the standards set forth by our forefathers when they drafted
the Bill of Rights64—Fernandez blurs a formerly clear line, seemingly
without regard to its future implications.
The majority in Fernandez addressed the concern with societal
norms echoed in Randolph, maintaining that if a social caller were to
request entry, the caller would be concerned only with obtaining
permission to enter only from those residents who are physically
and immediately ask the remaining cotenant for permission to search, all in the space of a few
minutes.
60. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135–36 (imagining a situation where a coresident would
never be able to consent to a search, even decades after the original objection).
61. Id. at 1136 (“Nor are we persuaded to hold that an objection lasts for a ‘reasonable’
time. ‘[I]t is certainly unusual for this Court to set forth precise time limits governing police
action,’ and what interval of time would be reasonable in this context? A week? A month? A
year? Ten years?” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
62. Presumably, after a time period this short, a court would be forced to examine any
“evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the
sake of avoiding a possible objection.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
63. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
64. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A police officer’s
determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be
broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.”). Police officers
arguably need easy, bright-line rules to follow—in the heat of the moment, police should not be
required to undergo a complicated analysis, compile all the case law the officer knows, and
make a fact-based determination based on the facts he knows in that moment. What an officer
needs in order to promote justice and equality is a bright-line, easy-to-apply rule—for instance,
a rule that says an officer may not perform a consent search once an objection has been made
from a cotenant who was physically present—even if the objector is no longer present when a
different cotenant gives the officer permission to perform such a search. See also, e.g., Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single, familiar standard is essential to guide
police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”).
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present.65 The Court found it quite obvious that a caller would not be
deterred from entry if the caller heard an objection, but the objector then
left the premises and the caller received an invitation to enter. 66
Fernandez emphasized that a social caller would be even more likely to
enter “when [the caller] know[s] that the objector will not return during
the course of the visit.”67 The treatment of social norms in Fernandez,
in stark contrast with the decision under Randolph, 68 adopted this
cursory treatment of societal norms to reach the conclusion that its
decision did not contradict the reasoning behind Randolph. Although
the Court addresses this question of social expectations with ease, the
reasoning in Randolph seems to contradict the Fernandez majority’s
quick treatment of the issue. After all, “when people living together
disagree over the use of their common quarters, a resolution must come
through voluntary accommodation, not by appeals to authority.” 69
Randolph imagined that upon hearing a cotenant object to entry, a social
caller would be reluctant to disregard that person’s authority and still
enter the premises.70 Indeed, “no sensible person would go inside under
those conditions.”71
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent asserted that the majority opinion in
Fernandez “shrinks to petite size our holding in Georgia v. Randolph
that ‘a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a
police search [of his home] is dispositive as to him, regardless of the
consent of a fellow occupant.’” 72 Indeed, Fernandez could eliminate
altogether the usefulness of the Randolph exception to the consent
rule.73 The dissent also recognized that the significant facts recognized
in Randolph are mirrored in Fernandez: a warrantless search, not
subject to exigent circumstances, was purposed on finding evidence to
use against a suspect; the suspect, while physically on the premises—in
fact, inside the doorway—objected to the search; and the officers could
easily have secured the premises for the time necessary to obtain a
warrant. 74 Finally, investigating officers are often extraordinarily
concerned with the destruction of evidence in the time required to
65. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006).
69. Id. at 113–14.
70. Id. at 113.
71. Id.
72. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1139 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original)
(citation omitted).
73. Because the majority refused to adopt a “reasonable time” for an objection to last, a
police officer after Fernandez may hear an objection, remove the objector, and go immediately
back to the residence to obtain consent from a remaining coresident. Id. at 1136 (majority
opinion).
74. Id. at 1139 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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obtain a warrant; however, this was not a drug case or a case with
similarly destructible evidence—“with the objector in custody, there
was scant danger to persons on the premises, or risk that evidence might
be destroyed or concealed, pending request for, and receipt of, a
warrant.”75
The majority did recognize several legitimate problems with
allowing a formerly present objector to override consent given by a
coresident upon the absence of the objector: Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence shies away from fuzzy, subjective standards, and to
institute a “reasonable time” for which a formerly present objector
could override consent would be difficult for police to implement. 76
However, as discussed above, the police will likely find the Fernandez
standard just as difficult to work with, given that officers must avoid
“remov[ing] the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the
sake of avoiding a possible objection.” 77 Courts, too, will find it
problematic to determine whether police attempted to remove an
objector purely to avoid the warrant requirement—an issue made
especially difficult after Fernandez confirmed a precedent of ignoring
the subjective motives of the police.78
The majority also spotted the problem of “the procedure needed to
register a continuing objection;” that is, whether preemptive objections
could be made, or even whether a potential defendant could put in a
“standing objection” with the local police. 79 Finally, the Court noted
that problems would arise with regards to which police officers would
be bound by a prior objection—would the objection extend to officers
who were not on scene at the moment of the objection? 80 Could a
different law enforcement agency (such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation) be bound by the previously present objector, even if those
officers were not on scene?81
Although these problems are legitimate, lower courts are capable of
handling these case-by-case questions as they inevitably arise. More
serious questions are raised by the majority’s solution: can our
communities trust police officers not to coerce unknowing residents to
consent to searches by threatening removal of any objectors?82 How can
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1136. Moreover, the Court acknowledged its own reticence to “set[ting] forth
precise time limits governing police action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
78. Cf. id. at 122.
79. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1136.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. In the wake of police misconduct such as the stop-and-frisk procedures deemed
unconstitutional in New York City, it is unlikely that communities, especially those made up of
targeted minorities, will put such faith in their officers. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects
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police officers be expected to guard themselves against the temptation
to violate constitutional rights when the courts are turning a blind eye?
Should police officers bear the burden of determining where the blurry
consent search line can be drawn in each instance, when even the
highest Court in the country is constantly redefining the metes and
bounds of the Fourth Amendment?83
Under the facts in Fernandez, the Court could have deemed the
search unreasonable and unconstitutional in light of Randolph, and
should have done so in light of the policy concerns highlighted in this
Comment. Because the defendant was physically present at the time of
the objection, and because of the short time period between his
objection and his cotenant’s consent to search the premises,84 this search
should have been deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
especially when considering societal norms. 85 Although the majority
may have toed the “fine line”86 drawn in Randolph, it did so without
considering its ramifications. This adherence to the letter of the law
without regard to the spirit of the law87 is bound to cause confusion in
our justice system and impede the ability of honorable civil servants
from protecting constitutional rights. The Court in Fernandez blurred
the line between the consent exception to the warrant requirement and
an unreasonable search in violation of the Constitution—because this
standard is unworkable, confusion will result when both police and
courts apply the reworked consent standards. This confusion will likely
lead to more violations of the Constitution, and “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures”88 will be less secure because of this
decision.
New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html (reporting that the
judge “concluded that the stops, which soared in number over the last decade as crime continued to
decline, demonstrated a widespread disregard for the Fourth Amendment”). Even if the majority of
police officers in our country do the best they can to ensure peace while respecting individual rights,
can society expect officers to know when to draw the line?
83. In 2011 and 2012 alone, the Supreme Court decided nine cases dealing with the
Fourth Amendment. Orin Kerr, Review of the Court’s Fourth Amendment Cases, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 8, 2011, 1:22 PM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/review-of-the-courts-fourthamendment-cases/; Orin Kerr, Reviewing the Fourth Amendment Cases of OT2011,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 10, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/reviewing-thefourth-amendment-cases-of-ot2011/.
84. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130.
85. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006).
86. Id. at 121.
87. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a
familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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